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THE BRITISH AND DANISH MONARCHIES’ AWARDS OF 
ROYAL WARRANTS IN RELATION TO EU STATE AID 
LAW AND THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS
Anders Mihle*
Summary: This paper examines the effect of royal warrants in the Uni-
ted Kingdom (UK) and Denmark on the internal market of the Europe-
an Union (EU) in relation to applicable EU legislation and case law on 
state aid and the free movement of goods. Firstly, the paper examines 
the British and Danish monarchies’ selection procedures for the com-
panies awarded royal warrants. Secondly, it discusses the economic 
effect of royal warrants on competition on the internal market. Thirdly, 
EU provisions and case law on state aid are outlined and discussed 
in relation to the award of royal warrants, followed by a discussion 
of the concept of the state and ‘emanation of the state’ in EU and 
national law. In order to complement the legal definition of state, the 
political role and powers of the Danish and British monarchies are 
examined.  Lastly, royal warrants are discussed in relation to the free 
movement of goods (Article 34 TFEU) and the effect of ethnocentric 
campaigns on the internal market. It will be demonstrated that mo-
narchies fall within the concept of ‘emanations of the state’ and that 
they are therefore obliged to comply with EU provisions on state aid 
and free movement of goods. The examination of the economic effect of 
royal warrants points to the fact that royal warrants distort competi-
tion and affect trade on the internal market because they are likely to 
provide selected businesses with a disproportionate advantage over 
their competitors. The paper concludes that the Danish and British 
monarchies’ awards of royal warrants contravene the provisions on 
state aid and free movement of goods under EU law. The paper addi-
tionally demonstrates that monarchies favour products of their own 
national origin, which constitutes a discriminatory measure. 
1 Introduction – a twist of royal esteem
Looking on the shelves in grocery stores such as Waitrose, Tesco, 
Sainsbury or a local kiosk, one will find various products that have a 
royal warrant of appointment awarded by either the British or the Danish 
monarchy (among others).1 When twisting and turning the product and 
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finding the small label, one may wonder what the predicate actually me-
ans and what can be derived from the award. 
The monarchies of the UK and Denmark have maintained a long tra-
dition of appointing certain companies that supply goods to the royal ho-
usehold as purveyor to the Royal Court.2 By obtaining the right to apply a 
predicate to their products, the supplying companies have the advantage 
of indicating that they have achieved the prestigious status of supplier to 
the Royal Court. One may wonder how European consumers react to this 
label and whether it has an effect on the competition between the compa-
nies awarded and the companies who have not obtained this status. The 
potential problem of royal warrants is that they are not only a jolly cultural 
tradition, but that selected companies (often companies of national origin) 
are invited into an exclusive club where esteem is conveyed through the 
acknowledged favour of an institution, which may represent the state. This 
raises the question of whether royal warrants have a particularly beneficial 
effect on the producers who are thus awarded, as such an effect may have 
a significant impact on competition on the internal market and may affect 
trade within the EU. The key question here is whether the British and Da-
nish monarchies represent the states of the UK and Denmark respectively, 
and whether in legal terms they can be characterised as ‘emanations of the 
state’. In order to answer these questions, this paper examines the British 
and Danish monarchies’ usage of royal warrants, their separate procedure 
for selection for the award ‘by appointment to the court’, and the concept 
of ‘emanation of the state’ pursuant to the case law of the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) and national courts. Further, this paper will also seek to 
examine the economic effect of royal warrants and whether it may affect 
trade and distort competition within the EU. 
Ultimately, this will enable us to see whether royal warrants are in 
accordance with the EU’s provisions on state aid and the free movement 
of goods. The purpose of comparing the British and Danish monarchies 
is to compare the role of royal warrants in two Member States, and to 
examine how the two monarchies have developed their practice alongside 
the loss of national sovereignty to the EU and increasingly restrictive EU 
provisions in areas that affect trade in the internal market. However, it 
should be emphasised that this paper does not seek to answer or politi-
cise the question of the general role of monarchies in the UK or Denmark 
or the future roles of these institutions. 
1 Within the EU, the following monarchies also award royal warrants of appointment: 
Belgium, Monaco, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
2 The designation ‘Purveyor to HM the King’ came into use at the beginning of the 19th 
century, whereas the designation ‘Purveyor to the Royal Danish Court’ was granted for the 
first time in 1904. Since then practice has been to grant ‘Purveyor to HM The King’ - at pre-
sent ‘Purveyor to HM The Queen’ - to firms or individuals in direct contact with the Royal 
House and ‘Purveyor to The Royal Danish Court’ to firms supplying the Royal Household.
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2 The award of royal warrants of appointment
This section seeks to examine the selection process in the award of 
royal warrants to individual companies. Royal warrants are advertised 
on companies’ products through the display of a coat of arms. Underne-
ath the coat of arms usually appears a phrase, eg ‘Purveyor to the Royal 
Court’, ‘Supplier to the Royal Court’ or ‘By Appointment to the Royal 
Court’. The royal warrant enables the supplier to advertise that they are 
supplying the royal family, thus gaining royal and glamorous prestige.3
2.1 The British Monarchy – how to obtain a royal warrant
To become a purveyor to the British Royal Court, individuals or com-
panies must have supplied goods or services to the households of Her 
Majesty the Queen, His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh or His 
Royal Highness the Prince of Wales for a minimum of five years.4 Pur-
veyors to Her Majesty the Queen are entitled to use the Royal Arms as an 
integrated part of the firm name. Each member of the royal family can 
only grant one warrant to an individual business.5 However, businesses 
may obtain warrants from more than one member of the royal family.6 A 
royal warrant is in general granted for a period of five years and is regu-
lated in the Trade Marks Act 1994. According to the monarchy, holders 
of royal warrants today represent a large cross selection of British trade 
and industry (approximately 800 warrant holders). However, as the Mo-
narchy itself describes on its website, there are only a small number of 
foreign names.7
2.2 The Danish Monarchy – how to obtain a royal warrant
To become a purveyor to the Danish Royal Court and obtain a royal 
warrant, the applicant must have traded with the Royal Household or the 
Royal House regularly. Therefore, isolated deliveries and services for the 
day-to-day running of the Royal Household, to members of the Royal Ho-
use or for grand occasions do not entitle businesses to a royal warrant.8 
Furthermore, it is essential that the company is well-established, finan-
cially sound, well-managed and reputable.9 The Lord Chamberlain’s Offi-
3 ‘Royal warrants’ (The British Monarchy, 2008/2009) <http://www.royal.gov.uk/Monar-
chUK/Symbols/Royalwarrants.aspx> accessed 23 August 2013.
4 ‘Royal warrants’ (n 3).
5 ‘Royal warrants’ (n 3).
6 ‘Royal warrants’ (n 3)
7 ‘Royal warrants’ (n 3).
8 ‘Hofleverandører’ (Kongehuset) <http://kongehuset.dk/Organisation-og-kontakt/Hofle-
verandorer> accessed 23 August 2013.
9 De Kongelige Hofleverandører <http://www.hoflev.dk/hoflev4.asp> accessed 26 August 
2013. 
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ce assesses whether the application meets the conditions, whereupon 
the Queen personally assesses and appoints the new purveyor.10 Royal 
warrants of the Danish monarchy are regulated in Markedsføringslovens 
§ 1,11 Varemærkelovens § 1412 and Straffelovens § 132.13 The monarchy 
stresses that purveyors are broadly represented. However, according to 
their own information, there are only 6 foreign suppliers compared with 
100 national suppliers.14 
3 The economic effect of royal warrants 
Based on the assumption that monarchies are an ‘emanation of the 
state’, it is necessary to determine whether royal warrants fall within the 
scope of state aid.  To do this, I will examine the economic effect on the 
businesses that have been awarded a royal warrant in relation to their 
competitors in order to determine whether it is an advantage, and to what 
extent it might affect trade on the internal market and distort competi-
tion (domestically and inter-state). Miek Van der Wee gives two reasons 
in particular to explain why it is important for EU institutions to control 
the area of state aid.15 Primarily, state aid can be extremely harmful eco-
nomically as it can distort competition between companies within the 
EU.  If a company has easier access to subsidies, eg advertising, then 
this company will have an advantage over other companies, as it will be 
able to gain a larger share of the market and will also have less incentive 
to improve the efficiency of its operations.16 Secondly, state aid control 
at the EU level is important to protect the internal market of the EU, as 
subsidies can easily distort competition. Historically, during the founda-
tions of the internal market, Member States agreed not to create barriers 
to free trade and fair competition. Competition can be distorted not only 
by the abusive behaviour of private companies, but also by governmental 
interventions, eg subsidies. This is why the European Commission (Com-
mission), and not individual Member States, has the task of setting up 
effective safeguards to prevent individual Member States from giving do-
mestic companies unjustifiable advantages over competitors from other 
Member States.17 
10 Hofleverandører (n 8).
11 Bekendtgørelse af lov om markedsføring (Markedsføringsloven) LBK nr 58 af 20/01/2012.
12 Bekendtgørelse af varemærkeloven (Varemærkeloven) LBK nr 109 af 24/01/2012 .
13 Bekendtgørelse af straffeloven (Straffeloven) LBK nr 1028 af 22/08/2013.
14 Hofleverandører (n 8).
15 Miek Van der Wee, ‘State Aid and Distortion of Competition’ (Speech at the Conference 
on Competition Enforcement Challenges & Consumer Welfare, Islamabad 2005) < http://
ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2011_17_en.pdf> accessed 2 August 2013.
16 Van der Wee (n 15).
17 ‘Royal warrants’ (n 3). 
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It is important to investigate the purpose and historical background 
of royal warrants and to examine the ‘effect’ they have on the compa-
nies that have been thus awarded. Royal warrants have been given to 
suppliers to the Royal Court for centuries and, as will be demonstrated 
later in this paper, they have a significant symbolic value for those who 
receive them. This leads us to the question of what a royal warrant in-
dicates about the companies thus awarded. When products are given 
an advantage, for example by a quality label or by the endorsement of 
public figures or celebrities, it often has a positive effect on the products 
in terms of sales.  Nonetheless, little attention or literature on the effect 
of royal warrants has come from the academic and media world. In a 
short documentary on the BBC, ‘Are Royal Warrants the Ultimate Seal 
of Approval?’18 the effect of royal warrants was questioned. In the docu-
mentary, a British wine merchant in London, Berry Brothers & Rudd, 
which has been a supplier to the Royal Court for many years, is asked 
how important it is to have this official seal of approval. The owner held 
that it was very important for the business and continued ‘… it makes us 
know that we are doing our job correctly’. The BBC further asks whether 
the owner thinks that customers are more likely to buy his products if 
they see the royal warrants. The business owner responds that he belie-
ves consumers see the royal warrants as a seal of approval which may 
indicate that if the product is good enough for the Queen (indicating the 
Queen’s high expectation of quality) it is then good enough for the ave-
rage consumer. Berry Brothers & Rudd’s statement indicates that their 
status as purveyor to the Royal Court has had a positive effect on their 
business, although this does not constitute statistically significant evi-
dence. Danish journalist Jens Høvsgaard19 supports the claim that royal 
glamour has an effect on the selected businesses and in his recent book 
Det Koster et Kongerige he argues that many businesses do not offer gifts 
to the Danish Royal Family simply because they esteem the institution, 
but rather in the hope of the company and its products being ‘sprinkled 
[with] royal glamour’20 and thereby increasing sales.
In relation to the recent celebration of the anniversary of the Bri-
tish Queen’s Coronation, the Daily Express interviewed several royal 
warrant holders.21 Here, the holders clearly recount that the warrants 
18 Tim Muffett ‘Are Royal Warrants the Ultimate Seal of Approval?’ (BBC News Business, 28 
May 2012) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18232594> accessed 28 May 2013.
19 Jens Høvsgaard is a Danish journalist who is a critic of the Danish Monarchy.
20 Jens Høvsgaard, Det koster et kongerige. Bag om kongehusets penge og privilegier (1. 
udgave, 2. oplag, Rosinante 2013) 163.
21 Melanie Whitehouse ‘Fit for the Queen: The Companies Proud to be Royal Warrant 
Holders’ Daily Express (London, 10 July 2013) <http://www.express.co.uk/news/
royal/413717/Fit-for-the-Queen-The-companies-proud-to-be-Royal-Warrant-holders> 
accessed 26 August 2013.
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have significant value. For instance, a textile manufacturer emphasises 
that the royal warrant is a sign of value.22 A chocolatier states that the 
royal warrant is a great badge of esteem and highlights that being a royal 
warrant holder means being part of an extraordinary club.23 Additionally, 
one of the latest companies to receive a royal warrant, Covent Garden 
Flower Market, was asked by the BBC about the kind of impact the new 
title of Purveyor to the Royal Court has had on the business.24 The owner 
held that the impact had not been economically good. However, he stated 
that it had given prestige to the business and existing customers and 
customers around the market had applauded the award. Other business 
owners argue that a royal warrant signifies a standard of service, quality 
and liability.25 As the above-mentioned statements indicate, it may be 
argued that royal warrants do not necessarily always give an economic 
advantage to companies. Besides, it may not always serve as a good ad-
vertisement for companies who sell their products in countries where 
the British monarchy is generally disliked because of the country’s poli-
tical orientation or historical events. Vicky Bullen from Coley Porter Bell 
Brand Design draws attention to the fact that royal warrants have a posi-
tive effect in the UK and Asia, where they are still a mark of prestige, and 
also in the United States.26 Nonetheless, she also states that they may 
not necessarily be an advantage in countries that do not like monarchies 
and/or the UK.27 In another article from the BBC about a Northern Irish 
company which has recently been awarded a royal warrant, the business 
emphasised that ‘…  to have that kind of independent recognition of what 
we do will serve us well moving forward’.28 Again, it is emphasised that a 
royal warrant provides a label of prestige, success and quality.  
The above-mentioned interviews with companies that have been awar-
ded royal warrants indicate that the warrants have had a positive effect on 
their businesses. Overall, it can be argued that royal warrants can be con-
sidered ‘free’ advertising and marketing subsidised by the government - if 
we assume that monarchies are an emanation of the state. The advertising 
here takes the form of quality labelling, which gives undue advantages to 
selected companies. Nevertheless, it is important to clearly state that the 
interviews do not constitute any proof or significant statistical data, and 
thus it is not possible to generalise the effect of royal warrants on the in-
22 ibid.
23 ibid.




28 Colletta Smith ‘Royal Warrant for Irvinestown’s Lakeland Computers’ (BBC News 
Northern Ireland, 10 January  2012) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ire-
land-16469246> accessed 31 July 2013.
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ternal market. In order to give a precise assessment of the effect, more data 
and examinations will be needed. As the task of statistically examining 
these effects requires substantial resources, a statistical survey does not 
form part of this paper. However, the ‘examination’ from the sources above 
still gives us a qualitative idea about how the effect of royal warrants may 
work. Thus, if royal warrants do give some businesses advantages over 
other businesses in terms of sales, they may be a serious threat to trade 
and may distort competition on the internal market of the EU. 
4 State aid under EU law
In order to discuss the question of royal predicates, it is essential to 
outline the EU law on state aid and to whom it applies. The objective of 
state aid control is to ensure that government interventions do not distort 
competition and trade inside the EU, as laid down in the founding Treati-
es of the European Communities.29 In this respect, state aid is defined as 
an advantage of any form conferred on a selective basis to undertakings 
by national public authorities.30 
4.1 Legal basis
Article 3(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) verifies that: ‘… 
the Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the susta-
inable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and 
price stability and a highly competitive social market economy...’ 
Regulations on state aid are provided in Article 107 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which defines that state 
aid and measures having equivalent effect are subject to general prohibi-
tion. Under Article 107(1) TFEU, the concept of state is not restricted to 
the federal or central authorities of Member States, but includes regional 
and local bodies, whatever their status.31 This indicates that state aid 
may emanate from any body within the public sector, pursuant to the Air 
France v Commission case.32 Article 108(1) TFEU lays down that the Com-
mission reviews existing aid policies and proposes any measures requi-
red by the progressive development or functioning of the internal market. 
Article 108(2) TFEU states that if the Commission finds aid granted by 
a state or through state resources to be incompatible with the internal 
market pursuant to Article 107 TFEU, or if it is being misused, it shall 
29 Michelle Cini, ‘The Soft Law Approach: Commission Rule-making in the EU’s State Aid 
Regime’ (2001) 8(2) JEPP 192, 196.
30 Europa/European Commission, Competition, ‘State Aid Control Overview’ <http://
ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/> accessed 2 August 2013.
31 Kelyn Bacon, European Community Law of State Aid, (OUP, Oxford 2009) 26.
32 Case T-358/94 Air France v Commission [1996] ECR II-2109, para 56.
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decide that the state concerned must abolish or alter such aid policies 
within a period to be determined by the Commission. Article 108(3) TFEU 
prescribes that prior to granting new or altering existing aid, states must 
inform the Commission, which will submit its comments. If the Commi-
ssion finds that the aid is not compatible with the internal market it will 
undertake the procedure under Article 108(2) TFEU. 
Article 107(1) TFEU applies to aid of any form pursuant to Steenko-
lenmijnen v High Authority.33 In relation to the question of whether the 
granting of state aid can be seen as a breach of EU law, it follows from Ar-
ticle 107(1) TFEU that the measure would be liable to distort competition 
and affect trade between Member States. The test defines whether the aid 
strengthens the position of an undertaking in relation to its competitors 
pursuant to Siemens v Commission34 and Ter Lembreek v Commission,35 
where it has been determined that it may be regarded as aid even if it 
extends to the whole sector.  The following review of the provisions on 
state aid is a selection of the relevant criteria and case law for this paper’s 
focus on royal warrants. 
4.1.1 State aid granted through state resources 
Article 107(1) TFEU applies to aid granted by a Member State or thro-
ugh state resources. In the Preussen Elektra case,36 the ECJ defined that 
a measure is not state aid unless it is financed through public resour-
ces.37 Advocate General (AG) Jacobs gave a ‘narrow’ and ‘wide’ view on the 
interpretation of Article 107(1) TFEU in Preussen Elektra, where he held 
that any measure which confers economic advantages on specific under-
takings, and which is the result of conduct ascribed to the state, should 
be considered state aid.38 On the other hand, he argues that Article 107(1) 
TFEU may be interpreted in the sense that financing through state resour-
ces must be seen as a constitutive element of the definition of state aid.39 
4.1.1.1 State resources
Funds and assets granted through central government institutions 
constitute state resources.40 The same also applies to regional or local 
authorities.41 The crux of the question is whether state resources are 
33 Case 30/59 Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority [1961] ECR I, 
para 19.
34 Case T-459/93 Siemens v Commission [1995] ECR II-1675.
35 Case T-217/02 Ter Lembeek v Commission [2006] ECR II-4483.
36 Case C-379/98 Preussen Elektra [2001] ECR I-2099.
37 Bacon (n 31) 69.
38 Preussen Elektra (n 36) Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 115.
39 ibid para 116.
40 Bacon (n 31) 69.
41 Cases T-228 and 233/99 Westdeutsche Landesbank v Commission [2003] ECR II-435. 
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involved in the measure. The state resources criterion is met in circum-
stances where the aid originates from a levy system.42 The ECJ empha-
sised in Steinike und Weinlig v Commission43 that, when applying Article 
107 TFEU, the focus should be on the effect of the aid and not on the sta-
tus of the institutions entrusted with the distribution and administration 
of the aid. Nevertheless, where aid is granted through a public or private 
undertaking, it is necessary to show whether the funds in question are 
under state control.44 If it is determined that the funds derive from gene-
ral taxation, they may be regarded as state resources when they are de-
rived from parafiscal charges or other compulsory contributions, where 
the fund is under the control of the public authority.45 Nonetheless, in the 
Pearle case,46 the ECJ held that where parafiscal levies are earmarked for 
a specific purpose and are not under the control of the public authorities, 
the fund does not necessarily constitute state resources.47  
4.1.1.2  The imputability criterion
Through its case law, the ECJ has established that a measure is 
only state aid if it is attributable or imputable to the state.48  Where an 
advantage is granted through the resources of a public or publicly owned 
undertaking, imputability to the state cannot be inferred, which applies 
to many cases.49 However, AG Jacobs opined in France v Commission50 
that the day-to-day business decisions of a publicly owned undertaking 
taken without any interference from the public authorities should not fall 
within the scope of state aid rules. In the latter case, the ECJ held that 
it was necessary to examine whether the public authorities were actu-
ally involved in the adoption of the measures.51However, it follows from 
the ECJ that the formal independence of a public body from the state is 
not in itself sufficient to exclude it from state liability.52 The ECJ held in 
Air France v Commission53 that the conduct of a public sector body was 
attributable to the state, even though it enjoyed legal autonomy from the 
political authorities of the state. The ECJ concluded that the creation of 
independent institutions that allocate aid could not circumvent rules on 
42 Bacon (n 31) 73.
43 Case 78/76 Steinike und Weinlig v Commission [1977] ECR 595, para 21. 
44 Bacon (n 31) 74.
45 ibid.
46 Case C-345/02 Pearle [2004] ECR I-7139, para 36.
47 Pearle (n 46).
48 Bacon (n 31) 77.
49 ibid.
50 Case C-482/99 France v Commission [2002] ECR I-4397, Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 55.
51 France v Commission (n 50), judgment, para 52.
52 Bacon (n 31) 78.
53 Case T-358/94 Air France v Commission [1996] ECR II-2109 122, para 62.
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state aid.54 Where undertaking the measure does originate from the state, 
there is high probability that it may indicate imputability to the state even 
if a private undertaking carries out the measure.55 On the other hand, it 
can be argued that if the initiative to provide aid comes solely from the 
private undertaking, this does not necessarily constitute imputability to 
the state.56 In the Pearle case,57 the ECJ held that when parafiscal levies 
are earmarked for a specific purpose and are not under the control of the 
state, it might not fall within the scope of state aid.58
4.1.2 State aid favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain 
goods
The advantage to certain undertakings may only be an incidental 
effect of a measure which in fact is a general measure that applies to all 
undertakings.59 It has been held in case law that a measure is in princi-
ple selective if it provides advantages exclusively to certain undertakings 
or certain sectors of activity.60 To examine whether this is the case, it is 
essential to define the point of reference in order to compare different 
undertakings.61 However, this is not always a simple task. In its case law, 
the ECJ has emphasised that a comparison of undertakings in terms 
of whether or not an advantage exists should be made in a ‘comparable 
legal and factual situation’, based on the premises that it is in breach of 
the EU’s provisions on state aid.62 Provided that the aid measure favours 
specific undertakings, it does not matter if the aid is granted to a very lar-
ge group of beneficiaries, which the ECJ has emphasised in its case law.63 
Even if the aid is given to a large group of beneficiaries, it will still consti-
tute state aid.64 There are various categories of selective aid, irrespective 
of whether this concerns direct or indirect aid to particular sectors,65 
selection by size and resources,66 geographic regions within the Member 
54 ibid paras 63-67.
55 Case C-126/91 GEMO [2003] ECR I-13769, para 26, 
56 Bacon (n 31) 79.
57 Pearle (n 46).
58 Bacon (n 31) 74-79.
59 ibid 80. 
60 ibid.
61 ibid 80-81.
62 Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline [2001] ECR I-8365, para 41; Case C-409/00 Spain v 
Commission [2003] ECR I-1487, para 47; Case C-308/01 GIL Insurance [2004] ECR I-4777, 
para 68; Case C-172/03 Heiser [2005] ECR I-1627, para 40; Case C-88/03 Portugal v Com-
mission [2006] ECR I-7115, paras 54 and 56.
63 Case C-75/97 Belgium v Commission [1999] ECR I-3671, para 32; Case C-143/99 Adria-
Wien Pipeline [2001] ECR I-8365, para 48.
64 Bacon (n 31) 82.
65 ibid 81.
66  ibid 82.
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State, etc. 67 Highly relevant for this paper, the ECJ held in Commission 
v France68 that a certain discount exclusively provided for national pro-
ducts that were exported was considered selective aid under EU law.69 
The aforementioned examples are merely random, and the list of selective 
aid is not exhaustive.70 Nevertheless, aid that benefits all undertakings in 
the national territory, eg a uniform tax reduction within a Member State, 
is a general measure and is not considered state aid under EU law.71 
4.1.3 State aid distorting competition  
Under Article 107(1) TFEU, state aid should not distort competition. 
According to the case law72 of the ECJ, it is not necessary to demonstra-
te any actual effects on competition or trade for state aid provisions to 
apply, as the Commission will not be able to determine whether new aid 
has an effect on competition or trade, but only to assess whether it does 
so hypothetically.73 To determine whether aid distorts competition, it sho-
uld be examined whether the aid strengthens the position of the business 
in relation to its competitors.74  However, it is not necessary to examine 
the competitors’ position on the market, as it has been determined by the 
ECJ that a measure may be regarded as aid even if it extends to the whole 
sector. However, the question of strengthening the company’s position 
should be assessed by defining whether the business’s financial position 
as a whole is improved by the aid.75 The ECJ has emphasised through its 
case law76 that aid which is intended to relieve a business of the expenses 
that it normally has to cover in its day-to-day budget or its usual activi-
ties principally distorts competition.77 Furthermore, the ECJ has held78 
that if aid is granted in a sector characterised by intense competition it 
will usually distort, or at least risk distorting, competition. 
67 ibid 83.
68 Cases 6 and 11/69 Commission v France [1969] ECR 523.
69 Bacon (n 31) 84.
70 ibid.
71 ibid 85.
72 Case C-374/97 Italy v Commission [2004] ECR I-3679, para 44; Cases T-304 and 316/04 
Italy and Wam v Commission [2005] ECR I-10901, para 64.
73 Case T-298/97 Mauro Alzetta v Commission [2000] ECR II-2319, para 77.
74 Bacon (n 31) 94-96.
75 Cases 62 and 72/87 Exécutif Regional Wallon v Commission [1988] ECR 1573, Opinion 
of AG Linz para 20, and judgments paras 14-15; Case T-14/96 Bretagne Angleterre Irlande 
v Commission [1999] ECR II-139, para 78.
76 Case T-459/93 Siemens v Commission [1995] ECR II-1675, paras 48 and 77; Case 
T-214/95 Vlaamse Gewest v Commission [1998] ECR II-717, para 43; Case T-217/02 Ter 
Lembeek v Commission [2006] ECR II-4483], para 177.
77 Bacon (n 31) 96.
78 Case T-214/95 Vlaamse Gewest v Commission [1998] ECR II-717, para 46; Case 
T-217/02 Ter Lembeek v Commission [2006] ECR II-4483], para 178.
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4.1.3.1 De minimis aid
The ECJ has held in various cases79 that even small amounts of 
aid – de minimis aid – may distort competition and affect trade between 
Member States.80 Accordingly, it is not essential to determine whether 
the aid has a significant or substantial effect,81 and Article 107(1) TFEU 
does not set any specific amount or level for aid not to be considered to 
affect competition or trade between Member States.82 However, there is 
an exception to this rule (see 4.1.5).
4.1.4 State aid affects trade between member states
The requirement for it to be determined whether state aid affects tra-
de between Member States is an important one as this indicates whether 
the aid falls within the scope of the legislative jurisdiction of EU law or 
national law.83 It is therefore important to examine whether certain aid 
strengthens the position of one business compared with others on the in-
ternal market of the EU. However, to fall within the scope of state aid, it is 
not necessary for businesses to operate at an inter-state level in the EU, 
ie in the markets of more than one Member State.84 In a situation where 
the business only operates at the local level, ie it does not export its pro-
ducts, it may still affect trade in the internal market, since the beneficial 
aid may strengthen the business’s position in the local market,85 which 
may be a disadvantage for other businesses from other Member States 
and thereby a potential barrier for them to enter that market.86
4.1.5 Derogations
The Treaty pronounces the general prohibition of state aid. Never-
theless, the founders agreed that in some circumstances government in-
terventions are necessary for a well-functioning and equitable economy,87 
especially during periods of financial crisis. Therefore, the Treaty leaves 
room for a number of policy objectives with which state aid can be consi-
79 Case C57/86 Greece v Commission [1988] ECR 2855 paras 17-18; Case C-142/87 Bel-
gium v Commission [1990] ECR I-959, para 43; Case C-310/99 Italy v Commission [2002] 
ECR I-2289, para 86; Case C-172 Heiser [2005] ECR I-1627, para 32. 
80 Bacon (n 31) 100.
81 Case T-55/99 CETM v Commission [2000] ECR II-3207, para 94.
82 Case C-71/94 Administracion del Estado v Xunta de Galicia [2005] ECR I-7419 para 41. 
83 Bacon (n 31) 97.
84 Case C-393/04 and C-41/05 Air Liquide Industries Belgium [2006] ECR I-5293, para 35.
85 Case 102/87 France v Commission [1998] ECR 4067, para 19; Case C-303/88 Italy v 
Commission [1991] ECR I-433, para 27; Case C-75/97 Belgium v Commission [1999] ECR 
I-3671, paras 47-49; Case T-298/97 etc Mauro Alzetta v Commission [2000] ECR II-2319, 
para. 91; Case C-280/00 Altmark [2003] ECR I-7747, paras 77-78.
86 Bacon (n 31) 98.
87 Europa/European Commission (n 30).
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dered compatible. Article 107(2) TFEU determines three areas that might 
be compatible with the internal market. However, only Article 107(2a) 
TFEU is relevant for this paper and determines that aid having a soci-
al character for individual consumers may be compatible with EU law, 
provided that the aid does not discriminate in relation to the origin of 
the product concerned. Furthermore, Article 107(3) TFEU provides five 
exceptions that may be compatible with the internal market: (a) aid to 
promote regional aid; (b) projects of common European interest or see-
king to counter serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State; 
(c) the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic 
areas; (d) cultural aid; and (e) aid specified by a decision of the European 
Council (Council). There are currently two Block Exemption Regulations. 
Firstly, the de minimis aid regulation88 exempts, among other things, aid 
below €200,000 over a period of three years under certain conditions. 
Secondly, the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBE)89 exempts from 
notification to the Commission various forms of aid90 up to certain spe-
cified monetary ceilings.91 In addition to the general exemptions, there is 
also a range of sector specific regulations governing grants of aid, and the 
Council has recently introduced new categories92 that the Commission 
may exempt from the obligation to prior notification.93 
88 Commission Regulation (EC) 1998/2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the 
Treaty to de minimis aid [2006] OJ L379.
89 Commission Regulation (EC) 800/2008 declaring certain categories of aid compatible 
with the common market in the application of Article 87 and 88 of the Treaty (General block 
exemption Regulation) [2008] OJ L214.
90 It follows from the GBE that the following are compatible with EU state aid law: SME in-
vestment and employment; small enterprises newly created by female entrepreneurs; con-
sultancy in favour of SMEs; SME participation in fairs; provision of risk capital, research 
and development; technical feasibility studies; industrial property rights costs for SMEs; 
research and development in the agriculture and fisheries sectors; young innovative en-
terprises; innovation advisory services and innovation support services; the loan of highly 
qualified personnel training; recruitment of disadvantaged workers in the form of wage 
subsidies; employment of disabled workers in the form of wage subsidies; compensating 
the additional costs of employing disabled workers; regional investment and employment; 
newly created small enterprises in assisted regions; investment to go beyond Community 
standards for environmental protection; acquisition of transport vehicles which go beyond 
Community environmental protection standards; early adaptation to future environmental 
standards for SMEs; investment in energy saving measures; investment in high efficiency 
cogeneration; investment in the promotion of energy from renewable energy; environmental 
studies and the environment, in the form of tax reductions.
91 Including aid in favour of SMEs; aid for research and innovation; regional development 
aid; training aid; employment aid; aid in the form of risk capital; environmental aid and aid 
promoting entrepreneurial activity.
92 New categories include aid for innovation, culture, natural disasters, sport, certain 
broadband infrastructure, other infrastructure, social aid for transport to remote regions 
and aid for certain agriculture, forestry and fisheries issues.
93 Council Regulation (EC) 733/2013 amending Regulation (EC) 994/98 on the application 
of Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty establishing the European Community to certain catego-
ries of horizontal State aid [2013] OJ L204.
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4.2 The approach of the European Commission 
The Commission aims to ensure that all companies within the EU 
operate on a level playing field where competitive companies succeed. It 
ensures that the interventions of Member States do not interfere with 
the smooth functioning of the internal market or harm the competitive-
ness of companies within the EU.94 It is argued that the Commission has 
hardened its approach to EU state aid policy and is moving away from 
a softer form of governance.95 It has strengthened its relationship with 
both EU institutions and national courts, which has driven it towards 
hardening rule making.96 On 8 May 2012, the Commission set out a new 
approach for reform in the Communication on State Aid Modernisation.97 
The Commission emphasises among other things that one of the key go-
als is to prioritise enforcement in cases that have a significant impact on 
the internal market. Joacquin Almunia, Vice President of the European 
Commission, stressed in his speech on 8 October 2012 that the objective 
of the reform was to ensure well-designed aid targeted at identified mar-
ket failures and objectives of common interest, and to avoid distortion of 
competition and inadequate support that does not give companies a real 
incentive, crowds out private investment and supports inefficient and 
unprofitable companies. In other words, good state aid strengthens the 
internal market and poor state aid weakens it.98 On 22 July 2013, the 
Council adopted rules to modernise state aid policy, where approval was 
given for the reform of procedural regulation99 which contributes to the 
Commission’s State Aid Initiative.100 The reform improves the handling 
of cases by ensuring that the Commission has all necessary information 
available by improving cooperation with national courts, gathering infor-
mation directly from market participants and thus being in a position to 
conduct sector inquiries.101 This will improve the efficiency and effective-
94 Europa/European Commission (n 30).
95 Cini (n 29) 204.
96 ibid 205.
97 European Commission Press Release, ‘State Aid: Commission Launches Major Initiative 
to Modernise State Aid Control’ (8 August 2012) IP/12/458 < http://europa.eu/rapid/pre-
ss-release_IP-12-458_en.htm> accessed 30 July 2013.
98 Joaquin Almunia, Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Com-
petition Policy, ‘Presenting the Competition Policy Work Programme for 2013/14 ECON’ 
(Speech/12/701 European Parliament, Brussels, 8 October 2012) <http://europa.eu/ra-
pid/press-release_SPEECH-12-701_en.htm> accessed 1 July 2013.
99 Council of the EU Press Release, ‘Council Adopts Rules to Modernise State Aid Policy’ 
(Brussels 22 July 2013) 12632/13, (OR. en) PRESSE 343 <http://www.consilium.europa.
eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/intm/138249.pdf> accessed 2 August 2013.
100 Almunia (n 978). 
101 European Commission Press Release, ‘State Aid: Commission Welcomes Council Adop-
tion of Revised State Aid Rules on Block Exemptions and Procedures’ (23 July 2013) 
IP/13/728 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-728_en.htm> accessed 1 August 
2013.
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ness of state aid control and provide the Commission with sufficient tools 
to tackle important cases which distort competition most significantly.102 
All this is a clear indication that state aid policy is of high priority for 
the Commission and leaves the impression that state aid is a matter on 
which the EU comes down hard. 
4.3 An early assessment 
As I will demonstrate in section 6, monarchies are largely financed 
by the state through public budgets, especially the Danish monarchy. 
This raises the question of whether the taxpayer’s contribution to the 
operating of monarchies through state budgets can be considered a pa-
rafiscal levy and whether the monarchies are under the control of public 
authority. Briefly, both the Danish and British monarchies are regulated 
in national law, which may indicate that they are under the control of 
the state. Looking closer at royal warrants, it may be argued that they 
confer an economic advantage on specific undertakings, which was exa-
mined in section 3. Further, looking at the nature of monarchies, it may 
be argued that they are attributable or imputable to the state, which will 
be considered later during the assessment of whether monarchies are an 
emanation of the state in sections 5 and 6. Additionally, as argued by the 
ECJ, it is essential to determine whether public authorities are involved 
in monarchies. Even though selection for the award of royal warrants is 
carried out independently and autonomously by the monarchies themse-
lves, the ECJ has held that EU state aid law will not accept independent 
institutions ‘allocating’ aid to circumvent rules on state aid. Thus, royal 
warrants may be caught by the ECJ’s conclusions if monarchies are con-
sidered to be an emanation of the state. 
Looking at the undertakings that have been awarded royal warrants, 
the provisions on state aid clearly prohibit aid if it is provided exclusively 
to certain companies, irrespective of the number of companies. Since the 
award of royal warrants should not distort competition, it is important to 
examine the economic impact of royal warrants, as dealt with in section 
3. Although it may be difficult to measure if they have any actual effect, 
the ECJ has held that it should be determined whether aid strengthens 
the position, especially the financial position, of the undertaking. In other 
words, the question to be asked is whether the businesses which have 
been awarded royal warrants are better off compared to their competitors 
which have not been thus awarded. This will be further examined in sec-
tion 8. However, a question arises on whether the royal warrants are a 
kind of aid that is so small that it does not distort competition. Overall, 
the ECJ has held that any aid, whatever the size, will be capable of distor-
102 European Commission Press Release (n 101).
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ting competition. Nevertheless, the de minimis aid regulation exempts aid 
up to a certain amount. And this leads to the question of how to calculate 
the effect of royal warrants, as already examined in section 3.
Royal warrants can be considered as ‘free’ advertising, quality la-
belling and promotion for those businesses that supply the royal hou-
seholds. To what extent would the effect of royal warrants, in normal 
situations, be covered by day-to-day management or operation? It should 
also be considered whether royal warrants affect trade between Member 
States. Even though it may be argued that royal warrants only affect the 
domestic market, eg carpenters or flower suppliers, there will still be a 
breach of the EU provisions on state aid as they can affect businesses 
from other Member States who seek access to that market. Overall, this 
leads to the provisional conclusion that royal warrants distort competi-
tion and trade between Member States, that they are imputable to the 
state, that the aid originates from state resources and that the institution 
of monarchies are under the control of the state. 
If we assume that royal warrants are considered state aid, there 
may still be some derogation from the prohibition. Looking through the 
derogations from the prohibition of state aid, royal warrants do not, in 
principle, fall within any of the categories listed in Article 107(2) and (3) 
TFEU, and therefore cannot be justified there. This indicates that royal 
warrants are most likely in breach of the EU provisions on state aid. 
However, there needs to be a case-by-case assessment on whether the 
award of a royal warrant to a specific business can be justified by the 
exemption. For example, Carlsberg Brewery has a royal warrant from 
the Danish monarchy for all its products in the EU, and this campaign/
advertisement/quality label may indeed exceed the de minimis aid regu-
lation exemption of €200,000. Moreover, breweries are not to be found in 
any of the GBEs. In general, it is difficult to assess the dimensions of the 
royal warrant and calculate the actual financial advantage over time as 
this depends on a case-by-case assessment of the individual undertaking 
that has been awarded a royal warrant.
These assumptions are still not definite and I will therefore in the 
following sections discuss the nature of the monarchies of the UK and 
Denmark, including to what extent they can be considered an emanation 
of the state and whether they are under the control of public authority. 
Further, I will assess whether royal warrants fall within the provisions of 
Article 34 TFEU (free movement of goods) and whether they can be decla-
red incompatible with EU law. 
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5 An emanation of the state 
It is essential to determine whether the monarchies in the UK and 
Denmark can be considered bodies providing public services under the 
control of the state and thus be defined as ‘an emanation of the state’. 
Firstly, the Commission has held that state aid control comes into play 
when services are provided by a company and financed through public re-
sources, in particular because overly generous compensation could ena-
ble the service providers to cross-subsidise their other commercial activi-
ties, and thereby potentially distort competition.103 The task of identifying 
the state and its various organs or emanations can therefore be a crucial 
point for individuals seeking to rely on the rights and protections derived 
from EU law.104 Nonetheless, the nature of monarchies is not clear and 
in order to define whether or not they fall within the scope of ‘emanation 
of the state’ it is necessary to outline the case law of the ECJ and of the 
courts of individual Member States which have dealt with the question in 
order to identify the straw in the wind. A definition of the concept of state 
lies in different pieces from various cases of the ECJ. 
In Van Duyn and Ratti105 it was held that directives can be enforced 
by individuals against the state in its capacity of the state. Direct effect is 
limited with regard to directives, and in principle individuals are not able 
to rely on rights derived from directives (secondary legislation). However, 
the ECJ dealt with this issue in Marshall v Southampton.106 Miss Marshall 
worked for a public authority and wished to enforce a directive against the 
state acting in its capacity as her employer. The ECJ stated that individu-
als may only rely on provisions, such as a directive, in their relation to the 
‘state’ in its capacity as ‘employer or public authority’, since it is necessary 
to prevent states from taking advantage of their own failure to comply with 
EU law.107 However, such a provision cannot be relied upon in a case aga-
inst another individual.108 Here, the core is that while the ECJ held that 
direct effect would allow legal actions based on directives against the state 
(vertical direct effect), the ECJ accepted that the concept of state could 
appear in a number of emanations.109 It follows from the ECJ:
103 European Commission/Europa, Competition <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sta-
te_aid/overview/public_services_en.html> accessed 21 July 2013.
104 Jennifer Eady, ‘Emanation of the State’ (1997) 26 ILJ , 249.
105 Case 41/74 Yvonne van Duyn v Home Office [1974] ECR 1337; Case 148/78 Pubblico 
Ministero v Ratti [1979] ECR 1629.
106 Case 152/84 MH Marshall v Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Aut-
hority (Teaching) [1986] ECR 723.
107 ibid para 49.
108 ibid para 48.
109 Eurofound, European Industrial Relations Dictionary, ‘Emanations of the state’ <http://
www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/emanation-
softhestate.htm> accessed 9 August 2013.
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… where a person involved in legal proceedings is able to rely on a 
directive as against the state he may do so regardless of the capacity 
in which the latter is acting, whether employer or public authority. 
In either case it is necessary to prevent the state from taking advan-
tage of its own failure to comply with Community law.110 
The ECJ has thereby held that the state may appear in different kin-
ds of emanations.111 Whether or not undertakings fall within the scope 
of ‘emanation of the state’ is developed though the case law of the ECJ. 
Before discussing the nature of monarchies in relation to state aid and 
drawing any conclusions, I will briefly draw attention to cases in other 
areas of EU law which may offer an analogy to monarchies. 
5.1 Foster v British Gas – defining the concept of State
In the case of Foster v British Gas,112 in which six women who were 
employed by British Gas prior to its privatisation in 1986 were all for-
ced to retire when reaching the age of 60, before the date on which the 
corporation’s rights and liabilities were transferred to British Gas under 
the Gas Act 1986,113 the ECJ held that the individuals could rely on a 
directive against British Gas Ltd as it was an emanation of the state. 
In Marshall114 the ECJ had already ruled that discriminatory retirement 
ages violate EU law and therefore the core in Foster v British Gas was 
whether a directive could be invoked in proceedings against a nationa-
lised corporation (horizontal level).115 Essential to this case was defining 
to what extent British Gas could be seen as an organ of the state, and so 
the ECJ defined the term ‘emanation of the state’: 
… a body, whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, 
pursuant to a measure adopted by the state, for providing a public 
service under the control of the state and has for that purpose speci-
al powers beyond that which result from the normal rules applicable 
in relations between individuals.116 
By defining the concept of ‘emanation of the state’, the ECJ has de-
veloped three-stage criteria to determine whether a body is an ‘emanation 
110 Marshall v Southampton (n 106) para 49.
111 ibid.
112 Case 188/89 Foster v British Gas Ltd [1990] ECR I-3113.
113 The ECJ ruled that when a state has failed to implement a directive as required, that 
state should not be allowed to benefit from the failure. Therefore, the provisions of the Equal 
Treatment Directive (and any other EU directive) can be relied upon against any organisa-
tion that is an emanation of the state.
114 Marshall v Southampton (n 106).
115 Nicholas Grief, ‘Direct Effect of Directives and Organs of the State’ (1991) 16(2) EL Rev 
137.
116 Foster v British Gas (n 112) para 20.
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of the state’. Recalling what was said above, the first requirement is to 
determine whether there is a control element in the sense that the body 
is subject to the authority or control of the state. Second, there must 
be a public service element; and, lastly, there must be a special powers 
element.117 Nevertheless, the ECJ held that it is for the national courts 
to determine whether the body falls within the scope of an emanation of 
the state. In Foster v British Gas, the House of Lords decided that the de-
finition was wide enough to cover British Gas (which had been privatised 
some years earlier) and remitted the case to the Industrial Tribunal for 
compensation to be assessed. The ECJ concluded that the company was 
a state controlled body providing a public service. AG Van Gerven sought 
to define the concept of state in his Opinion in Foster v British Gas118 by 
comparing various cases of the ECJ. He emphasises that the ECJ only di-
stinguished between the concepts of ‘state’ and of ‘individuals’ in its case 
law. He points out that a third classification should be created, which 
lies within the notorious definition of a body between the two classifica-
tions.119 AG Van Gerven therefore draws attention to other areas of EU 
law where there is a notion of public authority and which will help define 
the concept of state. In the cases Van der Kooy v Commission,120 which 
are highly relevant for this paper as they concern state aid, the ECJ held 
that no distinction may be drawn between cases where aid is granted 
directly by the state and cases where it is granted by public or private 
bodies established or appointed by the state to administer the aid.121 As 
an example, the ECJ points to concrete indications of public aid, ie when 
a firm directly or indirectly owns 50% of the shares in the undertaking, 
appoints or hires members of the board and where certain decisions on 
the granting/award of aid have to be approved by ministers.122 In this 
way, the ECJ concluded that the undertaking in Van der Kooy did not 
enjoy full autonomy, but acted under the instructions of public authoriti-
es.123 It was thus concluded that the fixing of the contested tariff was the 
result of an action carried out by the Member State and fell within the 
concept of ‘… aid granted by a Member State for the purposes of article 92 
EEC’ (now article 107 TFEU).124 AG Van Gerven emphasised the following 
with regard to the ECJ judgment: 
117 Eady (n 104) 249.
118 Foster v British Gas (n 112), Opinion of AG van Gerven.
119 ibid para 10.
120 Cases 67, 68 and 70/85 Van der Kooy v Commission [1988] ECR 219.
121 ibid para 35.
122 ibid para 36.
123 ibid para 37.
124  ibid para 38.
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That definition of the State as the author of aid measures reflects 
a broad interpretation which corresponds to the purpose of Article 
92(1) of the Treaty [now article 107(1) TFEU], that of encompassing 
all aid measures: ‘any aid granted by a Member State or through 
State resources in any form whatsoever’.125
An examination of the selection process and the award of royal war-
rants (see section 2) does not suggest that the states (Denmark and the 
UK) instruct the monarchies on whom to select. However, this indication 
is not exhaustive and there are a number of other cases which deal with 
the nature of bodies.  
The issue of the concept of state was raised shortly after the judgment 
of Marshall126 in Johnston v Chief Constable,127 which concerned the po-
ssibility for an employee to rely on a directive128 against the Chief Consta-
ble. The British government refused the complainant’s claims and argued 
that individuals could not rely on the directive, as the Chief Constable 
was constitutionally independent of the state.129 However, the ECJ held 
the following: 
… the Chief Constable is an official responsible for the direction of 
the police service. Whatever its relation may be with other organs of 
the State such a public authority charged by the State with the ma-
intenance of public order and safety does not act as a private indivi-
dual. It may not take advantage of the failure of the State of which it 
is an emanation to comply with Community law.130 
Here, the ECJ again emphasises that bodies which have special 
powers compared with the rules applicable in relations between indivi-
duals may not act as a private individual for the reason that the state 
may not benefit from its own failure to comply with EU law, inter alia, the 
‘estoppel argument’.
Another area of EU law that may offer an analogy to the nature of 
monarchies is Directive 2004/18/EC.131 Article 1(9) of the directive de-
fines contracting authorities as any body: (a) established for the specific 
purpose of meeting needs in the general interest, not having an industrial 
125 Foster v British Gas (n 112) para 12.
126 Marshall v Southampton (n 106).
127 Case 222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 
1651.
128 Articles 3(1) and 4 of Council Directive (EEC) 76/207 on the implementation of the prin-
ciple of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational 
training and promotion, and working conditions [1976] OJ L39/40.
129 Johnston v Chief Constable (n 127) para 49.
130 ibid para 56.
131 Council Directive (EC) 2004/18 on the coordination of procedures for the award of pu-
blic works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] OJ L134.
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or commercial character; (b) having legal personality; and (c) financed, for 
the most part, by the state, regional or local authorities, or other bodies 
governed by public law – or subject to management supervision by those 
bodies – or having an administrative, managerial or supervisory board, 
more than half of whose members are appointed by the state, regional or 
local authorities, or by other bodies governed by public law. Many of the-
se criteria may indicate that monarchies, which in the case of public con-
tract, fall within the concept of contracting authorities, and this points 
to the fact that they may be an emanation of the state. The monarchies 
(especially the Danish one) are funded largely by public budgets, which 
I will touch on in section 6. Additionally, Article 4(5) of the Sixth Council 
Directive on VAT132 gives us another identification of ‘the straw in the wind’ 
of the ECJ’s definition of the concept of state. Its wording indicates that the 
provision is restricted to the activities or transactions in which states, regi-
onal and local authorities and other bodies governed by public law engage 
‘as public authorities’. This is also illustrated in the case law of the ECJ in 
Carpaneto Piacention and Rivergaro,133 where the ECJ held that the provi-
sion in question seeks to draw a distinction between the activities of those 
bodies which are governed by public law and those which are governed 
by private law. The important distinction here is thus in which capacity 
the public authority acts: as an authority or as a normal taxable person.134 
Turning to the core question of this paper, these findings lead to the conclu-
sion that monarchies, in contrast to private individuals, are in large parts 
subject to public law. Therefore, if one follows the ECJ’s reasoning, monar-
chies must be considered ‘emanations of the state’. Furthermore, AG Van 
Gerven draws attention to case law on Article 30 EC (now 34 TFEU) by 
raising the  Buy Irish case,135 which concerns the free movement of goods 
and may offer an analogy to Foster v British Gas136 and, in our case, an 
analogy to monarchies. The Buy Irish case concerns whether a particular 
restrictive practice can be ascribed to the authorities. The ECJ held that 
the restrictive practice could be ascribed to the government, and thus Ire-
land had failed to comply with its obligations under Article 34 TFEU, alt-
hough an association governed by private law carried out the actual un-
lawful act. This case again points to the conclusion that monarchies may 
be ascribed as public authorities. Furthermore, monarchies, by awarding 
royal warrants, may indicate ethnocentric campaigning indirectly linked 
132 Council Directive (EEC) 77/388 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to turnover taxes - Common system of value-added tax: uniform basis of asse-
ssment [1977] OJ L145.
133 Joined Cases 231/87 and 129/88 Carpaneto Piacention and Rivergaro [1989] ECR 3233, 
para 15.
134 Foster v British Gas (n 112) Opinion of AG van Gerven, para 14.
135 Case C-249/81 Commission v Ireland [1982] ECR 4005.
136 Foster v British Gas (n 112), Opinion of AG van Gerven, para 15.
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to the State. I will touch upon the Buy Irish case and ethnocentric cam-
paigns in section 8. Nevertheless, it should be noticed that the Opinion of 
an AG does not have any binding power during the proceeding of the ECJ 
and is not a valid source of law. However, the Opinion may offer guidance 
and help to understand important elements of cases in EU law.137
The definition of ‘emanation of the state’ in Fosters v British Gas was 
reinforced in Kampelmann,138 where it was held that a directive: 
may, however, be relied on against organizations or bodies which are 
subject to the authority or control of the State or have special powers 
beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable to re-
lations between individuals, such as local or regional authorities or 
other bodies which, irrespective of their legal form, have been given 
responsibility, by the public authorities and under their supervision, 
for providing a public service …139 
Nevertheless, one must be cautious when considering whether or 
not an organisation is truly an ‘emanation of the state’ since the ECJ gave 
the national courts the competence to decide whether or not an underta-
king falls within the concept of state. Thus, it is appropriate to examine 
the Danish and British courts’ definition of ‘state’ in the case law of the 
national courts. Apparently, the Danish courts have never had any cases 
dealing with the question of the concept of state. On the other hand, the 
Court of Appeal in England dealt with the question of ‘emanation of the 
state’ in the case of Doughty v Rolls Royce,140 where the court held that 
although the state owned Rolls Royce in its entirety it could not be reco-
gnised as an ‘emanation of the state’. Rolls Royce could not be considered 
to be providing a public service and did not therefore satisfy the three 
criteria given by the ECJ in Foster v British Gas. The crucial test here was 
not whether the undertaking in its entirety was owned by the state, but 
whether the body was an organ or agent carrying out a state function.141 
British Gas was providing a public service under the control of the 
state and thus it was considered that it had special powers beyond those 
resulting from the normal rules applicable in relations between individu-
als, eg powers to acquire land and break up streets and bridges.142  This 
may also concern other undertakings in similar contexts, such as electri-
city providers, water/wastewater treatment plants, etc. And as Nicholas 
137 De Burca & Others, EU Law: Text and Materials, (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 
62.
138 Joined Cases C-253/96 and C-258/96 Kampelmann [1997] ECR I-6907. 
139 Kampelmann (n 1388) para 46.
140 Doughty v Rolls-Royce [1992] ICR 538, [1992] IRLR 126  (CA).
141 Andrew C Geddes, ‘Foster v British Gas: Widening the Field of Direct Effect’ (1990) 140 
NLJ 1611.
142 Grief (n 115) 143.
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Grief emphasises, ‘… so much for the view that Foster would only be of li-
mited application’.143 AG Van Gerven held in his Opinion that it is argua-
ble whether universities have special powers as they have the competen-
ce to award degrees144 even if they are not under state control. Similarly, 
it can be argued that monarchies have special powers beyond those re-
sulting from normal rules applicable to relations between individuals. For 
instance, the Danish royal family is not accountable to the Danish courts 
and the monarch (Her Majesty the Queen Magrethe II) exclusively has 
the competence to judge members of the royal family for committing any 
crimes or offences pursuant to the Danish Constitution.145 Furthermore, 
in terms of formal ‘political power’, she technically appoints the Prime 
Minister.146 The monarch (Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II) in England 
holds four constitutional powers,147 and thus has, in comparison to the 
Danish monarch, a higher degree of actual political influence and power. 
The Foster ruling was touched upon again in another British case, 
Griffin v South West Water Services Ltd,148 in which the national court 
held that a post-privatised water company should be considered an ‘ema-
nation of the state’ in a claim relying on an EU directive. The English 
court broadened the definition of the concept of ‘state’ and held that the 
question of control given in the Foster test was to be decided with refe-
rence not to whether the body concerned was under the control of the 
state, but rather whether the public service provided by the company 
was under the control of the state.149 Overall, this indicates that the three 
criteria set by the ECJ, as mentioned above, in Fosters v British Gas are 
cumulative.150 Geddes argues that in order to assess whether an under-
taking is an emanation of the state it is necessary to carry out a careful 
investigation of the constitution, powers and financial structure of the 
public undertaking concerned in order to establish whether the ‘state’ is 
capable of exercising such influence over its conduct that it can be said 
to ‘control’ the undertaking within the definition provided by the ECJ in 
Foster v British Gas.151 As mentioned earlier, monarchies are mentioned 
in the written and uncodified constitutions of Denmark and the UK res-
pectively and have powers beyond those resulting from the normal rules 
applicable to relations between individuals. This indicates that monar-
chies are an ‘emanation of the state’, pursuant to the Foster ruling. 
143 ibid.
144 ibid.
145 See section 6.2.
146 See section 6.2.
147 See section 6.1.
148 Griffin v South West Water Services [1995] IRLR 15 (HC).
149 Eady (n 104) 250.
150 ibid.
151 Geddes (n 1411).
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5.2 The British approach - NUT v St Mary’s Church of England Scho-
ol
Another case of EU law that may offer an analogy to the nature of 
monarchies is National Union of Teachers v St Mary Church of England 
School,152 which concerned the transfer of teachers upon the opening of 
a new school. Most of the teachers had successfully obtained work at 
the new school, although three teachers were dismissed for reasons of 
redundancy on the day the old school closed. The dismissed teachers and 
the National Union of Teachers relied on an EU Directive153 and argued 
that the governing body of a voluntary aided school was an ‘emanation of 
the state’ and that the directive was therefore directly enforceable in this 
context. However, the English Employment Appeal Tribunal, which dealt 
with the case, rejected the argument, as the school did not meet the three 
criteria laid down by the ECJ in Foster v British Gas. Nonetheless, the 
case went to the Court of Appeal which did not agree with the decision 
of the Employment Appeal Tribunal. The Court of Appeal referred to the 
ECJ’s previous ruling in Fratelli Constanzo154 where the ECJ held that the 
concept of an ‘emanation of the state’ is very broad and covers all organs 
of administration, including decentralised authorities such as municipa-
lities. Thus, the Court of Appeal concluded that there was no exclusive 
formula, and nor did the ECJ, with the guidance of Foster v British Gas, 
try to set any fixed route for a decision on an ‘emanation of the state’. 
Interestingly, the Court of Appeal instead looked at the ECJ’s reasoning 
in Marshall,155 where it was held that individuals can rely on a directive 
against a Member State, as Member States should not benefit from the-
ir own failure to comply with EU law156  – the ‘estoppel argument’.157 In 
general, voluntarily aided schools are by their nature established, and 
to some extent controlled, by the Church. Nonetheless, the state relies 
on these institutions to supply education to citizens in particular areas 
of the country. The Court of Appeal held that voluntarily aided schools 
rely on local education authorities as they cover most of the expenses in 
running the school, including teachers’ salaries, etc, and therefore have 
a very considerable degree of control and influence over such schools.158 
In other words, the state may appear in a number of ‘emanations’ and 
152 National Union of Teachers and others v Governing Body of St Mary’s Church of England 
(Aided) Junior School and others [1997] IRLR 242; [1997] ICR 334 (CA).
153 Council Directive (EEC) 77/187 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, 
businesses or parts of businesses (Acquired Rights Directive) [1977] OJ L61.
154 Case 103/88 Fratelli Constanzo v Comune di Milano [1989] ECR 1839, para 31.
155 Marshall v Southampton (n 106).
156 ibid para 49.
157 Eady (n 104) 252.
158 Eady (n 104) 251.
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whether or not undertakings, bodies or organisations fall within the sco-
pe of the different emanations of the state depends on the criteria laid 
down and defined by the ECJ through case law. Drawing parallels with 
this and the case of monarchies where a large part of the funding derives 
from taxation, and looking back at the definition of Article 107 TFEU and 
state resources in section 4, these findings may indicate that the conduct 
of monarchies are attributable to the state, even though they are inde-
pendent and enjoy full autonomy in the selection and awarding of royal 
warrants. 
The above-mentioned cases and legislation may not deal directly 
with the provisions on state aid or free movement of goods (which will 
be covered later in section 7), but they still give an idea of how to define 
‘emanation of the state’ in other EU provisions and how national courts, 
especially British courts, apply the definition and this may therefore be 
analogically transferred to the concept of state in other areas of EU law. 
5.3 The approach of the European Commission
Finally, the criteria that may bring a public body within the scope 
of the concept of state according to the Commission should be exami-
ned. However, there is not much information from the Commission on 
the definition of public bodies. In his Opinion in Foster v British Gas, AG 
van Gerven outlined some of the Commission’s criteria that may bring a 
public body under the concept of state. There is the criterion of ‘carrying 
out a public function on behalf of the state’, which covers public corpora-
tions established to run nationalised industries (such as British Gas Ltd), 
public bodies which exercise regulatory powers, and universities which 
award degrees recognised by the state.159 
It has been argued that the legal form of ‘emanation of the state’ is 
irrelevant as long as it is responsible for providing a public service under 
the control of the state and has been awarded special powers for that 
purpose.160 This could include privatised industries or services, which 
formerly provided public services. 
So, what does all this tell us about monarchies? The overall asse-
ssment indicates that monarchies do have special powers, both legal and 
political: they act as state officials, are largely funded by the state and 
are governed by public law. All this indicates that they are an emanation 
of the state. 
159 Case C-189/89 Foster v British Gas [1990] ECR I-3313, Opinion of AG van Gerven para 
20.
160 Eurofound (n 109).
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6 Monarchies’ political role and effect on the state 
Historically, monarchies have had great influence on the political, 
legal and executive agenda of states. In order to define the role of mo-
narchies in the modern states of the UK and Denmark, it is essential to 
examine their legal nature, allocation of powers and their assignments 
as state representatives. It is further necessary to assess these factors as 
this may help to clarify whether the British and Danish monarchies are 
‘emanations of the state’ in an EU Member State and thereby subject to 
applicable EU legislation on state aid and free movement of goods. 
6.1 Monarchy in the United Kingdom
In the ‘uncodified’ Constitution161 of the UK, the monarch (also 
known as the Crown or Her Majesty the Queen) is the head of state. 162 
The monarch holds four key constitutional powers (royal prerogatives) 
and it is exclusively the Queen who may exercise these powers.163 Firstly, 
the Queen has the power to legally appoint whoever she desires to be 
the Prime Minister of the UK and likewise she could keep the position 
vacant. Historically, the Queen exercised this power in 1957 and 1963.164 
Secondly, the Queen has the power to dissolve Parliament at any time, 
for any reason, or for none.165 The power was last exercised in the UK in 
1834; however, it was exercised in Australia in 1975 and in Canada in 
2008.166 However, the power was revised in the Parliament Act of 2011. 
Likewise the Queen has the power to dismiss the government at any 
time for any reason, and cannot be challenged in a national court.167 The 
Queen has the power to withhold royal assent to legislation passed by 
the Houses of Parliament. A bill cannot become a legally binding Act of 
Parliament unless it receives the royal assent.168 In other words, the Que-
en has de facto veto power on all legislation passed by the parliament, 
161 The British Constitution is unwritten or, in other words, ‘uncodified’. This means that 
in contrast to most modern democracies, there is no single document which explains how 
the United Kingdom is governed. Instead, the Constitution consists of a number of treaties, 
laws and conventions, which together make up the constitution.
162 Vernon Bogdanor, ‘The Monarchy and the Constitution’ (1996) 49(3) Parliamentary Affa-
irs 407.
163 Republic, ‘The British Constitution’ <http://www.republic.org.uk/What%20we%20
want/In%20depth/The%20British%20Constitution/index.php> accessed 25 August 2013.
164 ibid.
165 ibid.
166  The Queen exercised her power to dismiss parliament in Australia, where the Queen’s 
appointed representative dismissed the democratically elected government of the day in 
1975 and, furthermore, in Canada where the Queen’s appointed representative prorogued 
parliament for several weeks in late 2008, preventing it from performing its democratic and 
constitutional functions, Republic (n 1633).
167 Republic (n 1633).
168 VRAC Crabbe, Understanding Statutes (Cavendish Publishing 1994) 17.
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and she is not required to give any reason for withholding her assent.169 
Furthermore, the monarch has royal prerogatives in various areas, which 
in theory are vested in the Crown. However, it should be noticed that in 
practice they are vested in the government. These royal prerogatives con-
sist of the powers to sign treaties, to declare war and to deploy overseas 
Her Majesty’s Armed Forces, to employ civil servants and to change the 
terms and conditions of their employment, the conduct of diplomacy, the 
governance of Britain’s overseas territories, the appointment and remo-
val of ministers, the appointment of peers, the granting of honours and 
the granting and revoking of passports.170, 171 The Queen also possesses 
judicial powers as she is the ‘source of justice’ and the courts belong to 
the Queen.172 Furthermore, she exercises various functions through the 
Attorney General and the Lord Advocate, ie pardoning convicted persons, 
offenders or remitting or reducing sentences, granting special leave to 
appeal to the Judicial Committee.173 Lastly, it should be mentioned that 
the Queen herself has legal immunity, as the Crown Proceeding Act 1947 
only allows legal proceedings against the Crown in its public capacity (ie 
against the government) and this quite remarkably means that no lawsu-
its may be instituted against the Crown personally; in other words the 
Crown has legal immunity. 
Bogdanor argues that these ‘formalities’ have little substance today, 
as the prerogative and legal powers of the Crown are exercised not by 
the Queen personally, but on the advice of ministers or by ministers di-
rectly.174 On the other hand, Ben Pimlott175 argues that the Queen’s poli-
tical influence is played out behind the scenes and is always subtle. The 
author draws attention to historical events where the Queen has expre-
ssed her political view. For example, the Queen questioned the merits of 
the British invasion of Suez in 1956176 and expressed her strong disa-
greement of the government’s support for the US invasion of Grenada in 
1983.177 She also expressed her view that the Thatcher government sho-
uld be more caring towards the poorer Commonwealth countries178 and 
169 Bogdanor (n 1622) 413.
170 Republic (n 1633).
171 Lucinda Maer and Oonagh Gay, ‘The Royal Prerogative’ (2005), Parliament and Consti-
tution Centre, House of Commons Library 3.
172 ibid 4.
173 ibid (n 1711) 2.
174 Bogdanor (n 1622) 414.
175 Ben Pimlott, former professor of politics and contemporary history at Birkbeck College, 
London University.
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in 1986 she expressed concern to Margaret Thatcher on British sanctions 
on South Africa.179 She also expressed her doubts about the decision 
to allow the Americans to use British airbases for a raid on Libya in 
April 1986.180 Pimlott criticises the Queen for her role in the handover of 
power between the Tory Prime Ministers Harold Macmillan and Alec Dou-
glas-Home.181 She allowed Macmillan to fool her into becoming a political 
pawn, described by Pimlott as ‘… the biggest political misjudgement of 
her reign’.182 As a result of ‘the Macmillan-Home debacle’183 the Conserva-
tives changed their method of selecting their leader.184 This effectively put 
an end to the monarch’s discretionary power of choosing the Prime Mini-
ster in normal circumstances. Nonetheless, Pimlott argues that the ma-
noeuvrings around the formation of the minority Labour government in 
1974 indicated that the monarch still retained a significant role, and the 
author goes on to state that though ‘… the Queen’s prerogative powers 
were never invoked’,185 there is the belief that they could be played out 
in a political battle.186  In sum, the British monarch has special powers 
beyond that of a ‘normal’ individual as she represents the state on vario-
us occasions and has exercised political influence in the UK a number of 
times. Therefore, it can be concluded that the monarchy in the UK is an 
emanation of the state.  
6.2 Monarchy in the Kingdom of Denmark
In accordance with § 2 of the Danish Constitution, Grundloven,187 the 
form of government is a constitutional monarchy. Under § 3 Grundloven 
it is determined that legislative power is vested in both the monarch and 
parliament together and executive power is vested in the monarch. The 
monarch in Denmark cannot be prosecuted for any criminal offences, 
pursuant to § 13. The monarch has the power to refuse or approve a bill 
by royal assent pursuant to § 22, and the power to dismiss and appoint 
ministers and the Prime Minister pursuant to § 14. Besides this, the mo-
narch is mentioned in several paragraphs of the Constitution under the 
term “The King” (Kongen). Nonetheless, it is argued that the Grundloven 





184 Paul Vallely, ‘Queen’s Politics Revealed’ The Independent (London, 3 October 1996) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/queens-politics-revealed-1355324.html> accessed 
21 August 2013.
185 Pimlott (n 1766) 423.
186 ibid 423.
187 The Constitutional Act of Denmark, Grundloven, was agreed on in 1849 and revised in 
1953. 
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should be interpreted in the context that ‘The King’ in practice designa-
tes the Prime Minister, as the Danish parliament and government would 
otherwise constantly violate the Constitution. Although it may seem that 
the Constitution provides powers to the monarch, reality is different as 
legislative power is vested exclusively in parliament and executive power 
is vested in the government. The monarch still formally approves all new 
governments, but the procedure is merely a formality, and compared to 
the British circumstances the Danish monarch has no say in this context. 
Nevertheless, the royal family still has an important role and influence in 
the state of Denmark as it acts as representatives and officials of the state 
domestically and internationally. Jens Høvsgaard, a journalist, emphasi-
ses that the Queen has a special position in Danish society due to the fact 
that she is not accountable to the law.188 Furthermore, with regard to the 
monarchy’s connection with the state, it is important to draw attention to 
the fact that the royal family receives annual funds, ‘apanage’, from the 
Danish state and is established by law.189 Jens Høvsgaard argues that 
the Queen is Denmark’s head of state and her family is the country’s offi-
cial representatives190 and the Queen’s statements represent the official 
position of Denmark on her official visits to foreign countries.191
Below, I will outline a few recent examples to support the hypothe-
sis that the Danish royal family represents Denmark as state officials. 
Firstly, the Danish Queen has, on several occasions, awarded the ‘cross 
of the order of chivalry’ to state leaders such as Nicolae Ceausescu, Haile 
Selaisse, King Fahd and Hosni Mubarak.192 Recently, shortly before the 
2011 revolts in Bahrain, the Queen awarded the ‘Knight’s Cross of the 
Order of the Dannebrog’ to King Hamad ibn Isa Al Khalifa, which was 
an unfortunate situation as it could be seen as an illustration of Danish 
state support for a dictatorship. In that respect, it has been publicly dis-
cussed whether the Queen on her own initiative decided to award the Or-
der or whether the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was responsible for 
this decision.193 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stresses that it is the mo-
narchy and not the government that is responsible for the award of the 
Orders.194 However, Lene Espersen,195 Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated 
the award of the Orders is decided between the royal court and the mi-
188 Høvsgaard (n 20) 163.
189 Lov nr. 491 af 7. Juni 2001 om Dronning Margrethe den Andens civiliste (Civillisteloven).
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nistry.196 Jens Høvsgaard emphasises that this might be problematic as 
the Queen and her activities should be apolitical.197 This points to the fact 
that the awarding of orders is a grey zone between the government and 
the monarchy and that the Queen therefore may have a certain degree of 
political influence. Zenia Stampe,198 Member of the Danish Parliament, 
in the case of the awarding of an Order to King Hamad ibn Isa Al Khali-
fa, argued that: ‘Awarding Orders is a special and very valuable political 
privilege’.199 She thus argues that the Queen holds an important political 
tool in awarding Orders, and in the given case represented Denmark’s 
official position on the human rights situation in Bahrain. Surely this in-
dicates, irrespective of whether or not the Queen autonomously decided 
to award the Order, that the Queen represents the state’s official positi-
on. Compared to the British monarchy, the Danish one does not have or 
exercise many powers. However, critics still argue that the royal family in 
Denmark executes important political actions when representing the sta-
te of Denmark. Financially, politically and legally, all facts strongly point 
to the conclusion that the monarchies of the UK and Denmark have state 
powers beyond those of individual persons and that they in certain cases 
influence the political practices of the state. This examination therefore 
indicates that these monarchies by their very nature are ‘emanations of 
the state’. 
7 Free movement of goods
In order to examine the case of royal warrants, the area of the free 
movement of goods also needs to be outlined. Case law of the ECJ has 
shown that campaigns promoting national products constitute a bre-
ach of the substantive right of free movement of goods. The following 
will include only the relevant provisions and case law in relation to the 
effect of royal warrants on the internal market from the perspective that 
they affect the companies from other Member States who wish to operate 
on the Danish or British domestic markets. According to the TFEU, the 
provisions on goods apply to ‘Member States’. This definition of state is 
broadly defined and includes central and local government. Additionally, 
the Treaty provisions on goods also applies to professional regulatory bo-
dies and private bodies supported by the state, whether through finance 
or other forms of supervision,200 which will be examined in section 8. 
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7.1 Legal basis
Article 34 TFEU prohibits quantitative restrictions on imports and 
measures having equivalent effect (non-tariff barriers).  There is no defi-
nition of the term quantitative restrictions in the TFEU, but it is generally 
accepted that they should be understood as any limitations in terms of 
the quantity of goods subject to import or even export. In the Dassonville 
case,201 the ECJ formulated the ‘Dassonville formula’ which states that ‘… 
all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hinde-
ring directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-community trade 
are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quanti-
tative restrictions’.202 
In Commission v Italy,203 the ECJ defined measures having equiva-
lent effect as follows: 
... measures adopted by a Member State the object or effect of which 
is to treat products coming from other Member States less favoura-
bly are to be regarded as measures having equivalent effect to qu-
antitative restrictions on imports within the meaning of Article [34 
TFEU], as are the measures referred to in paragraph 35 of the pre-
sent judgment. Any other measure which hinders access of products 
originating in other Member States to the market of a Member State 
is also covered by that concept.204 
In Prantl,205 the ECJ held that in order to constitute a breach of Article 
34 TFEU:
… it is sufficient that the measures in question are liable to impede, 
directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade between the mem-
ber states. It is not necessary that they should have an appreciable 
effect on intra-community trade. 
Furthermore, in the famous case Buy Irish,206 the ECJ held that the 
effect of the campaign was not essential, but instead emphasised the 
seriousness of the discriminatory purpose of the campaign, which was 
capable of affecting trade relations between Member States. The case will 
be explained in subsection 8.1. 
2010) 35.
201 Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837.
202 ibid para 5.
203 Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I-519. 
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8  Ethnocentric campaigns affecting the internal market 
Campaigns aiming to increase ethnocentrism are often framed as a 
desire to ‘support our own’, especially in times of economic hardship,207 
such as the on-going financial crisis, where it may be difficult for states 
to act with fairness in the internal market. ‘Buy national’ campaigns are 
by their nature intended to encourage consumers to purchase national 
products in preference to imported goods. Boosting ethnocentric consu-
mer behaviour may contravene the principles of the EU internal market 
and undermine the hard and long process of integration of the EU single 
market and removal of age-old barriers between states.208 This leads to 
the question of whether royal warrants can be defined as ethnocentric 
campaigns. I will examine this definition both from the perspective of 
the free movement of goods and state aid and whether there is a relation 
between the two areas in terms of ethnocentric campaigns. 
8.1 The Buy Irish campaign
Janja Hojnik describes some of the various so-called ‘ethnocentric 
campaigns of EU member states’ that promote national products.209 Eth-
nocentric campaigns on EU territory have been carried out for years. 
In the famous Buy Irish case,210 the Irish government tried to encoura-
ge its own nationals to buy Irish rather than imported goods. The ECJ 
stated that the association’s campaign was ‘… a reflection of the Irish 
government’s considered intention to substitute domestic products for 
imported products on the Irish market and thereby to check the flow of 
imports from other Member States’211 and declared that the campaign did 
constitute measures having effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions 
on imports pursuant to Article 34 TFEU. The ECJ held that Ireland had 
failed to fulfil its obligations under EU law by organising a campaign pro-
moting its own national goods within its territory.212
8.1.1 Opinion of Advocate General Capotorti – state aid versus free move-
ment
While the ECJ concluded that Buy Irish was an infringement of the 
free movement of goods, AG Capotorti in his Opinion emphasises a no-
teworthy view contrary to the ECJ:  
207 Robert P Williams, ‘Combating Economic Protectionism in the EEC: The Buy Irish Case’ 
(1983) 13(2) Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law 590.
208 Janja Hojnik, ‘Free Movement of Goods in a Labyrinth: Can Buy Irish Survive the Crisis?’ 
(2012) 49 CML Rev 301-302.
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210 Case 249/81 Commission v Ireland (Buy Irish) [1982] ECR 4005.
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209CYELP 9 [2013] 177-217
In the present case it seems clear to me that the contested activities 
are in the nature, not of barriers or obstacles to trade established 
by the public authorities, but rather of public aid whereby it is sou-
ght to give domestic producers a competitive advantage over foreign 
producers.213
In his argumentation, AG Capotorti draws attention to Commission 
v France,214 in which the ECJ held that under Article 92 EEC (now 107 
TFEU) the Member States agreed that any aid granted by them in any 
form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition is in-
compatible with the internal market.215 By linking the latter case to Buy 
Irish, AG Capotorti emphasises that the advertised campaign in Ireland 
was inspired and financed by the Irish government and thus, in his opi-
nion, clearly constitutes a case of state aid under Article 92 EEC.216  As 
mentioned in section 3 on the economic impact of royal warrants, AG 
Capotorti draws attention to the fact that the Irish campaign takes the 
advertising initiatives from Irish companies and covers the expenses that 
the same marketing would have lawfully cost the Irish companies, which 
places the Irish companies in an advantageous position to their compe-
titors from other Member States, thereby distorting competition in the 
internal market ‘… in so far as the burden of paying for the advertising 
is borne by an institution closely linked to the state’.217 This is supported 
by Robert P Williams who emphasises that foreign companies may suffer 
from ethnocentric campaigns if consumers withdraw their support for a 
foreign product in favour of a national product.218 Royal warrants may not 
necessarily be awarded on the governments’ initiative, as AG Capotorti 
argues in his Opinion in the case of Buy Irish. Nevertheless, as has been 
emphasised in section 5, monarchies are most likely an ‘emanation of the 
state’ (or at least largely financed by public money, which AG Capotorti 
also draws attention to in his Opinion on the Irish Goods Council), which 
is an indication that royal warrants fall within the scope of the EU provi-
sions on state aid. However, it should be mentioned that the ECJ did not 
follow AG Capotorti’s Opinion that the Commission in Buy Irish should 
have followed the procedure laid down under Article 93 EEC (now Article 
108 TFEU on state aid) and not the provision on the free movement of 
goods. Still, the Opinion of AG Capotorti is an interesting observation and 
highlights the relation between state aid and the free movement of goods 
in cases of ethnocentric campaigns, which may offer an analogy to royal 
213 Buy Irish (n 2100) Opinion of AG Capotorti, para 6.
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warrants. It is therefore necessary to examine what the ECJ has held in 
other areas, since AG Opinions are not a valid legal source, in order to 
arrive at a conclusion on royal warrants.219 
Similarly to Buy Irish, the Greek government launched a campai-
gn shortly after the Irish one to promote national products by offering 
a special discount on Greek products.220 However, the Greek campaign 
did not have any legal consequences. Nevertheless, the judgment of Buy 
Irish does indicate that campaigns, in which a Member State promotes 
products produced on its own territory, can been seen as a measure of 
having equivalent effect to quantitative restriction. Transferring this to 
the question of royal warrants, which is not directly or obviously a cam-
paign for domestic products as the famous Buy Irish case was, but rather 
a prestigious label of quality provided to selected companies supplying 
to the royal households.  In order to assess whether an element of an 
ethnocentric campaign exists in royal warrants as it does in Buy Irish, 
it is necessary to examine the case law on quality labels and to discover 
whether there is a relationship between the companies who are awarded 
royal warrants and the nationality of the companies. 
8.2 Quality labelling
     It may be argued that a royal warrant may represent a quality la-
bel for those companies that are awarded it and may have a positive effect 
on the business and thus an impact on the internal market.221 Especially 
relevant in relation to the discussion on royal warrants and whether they 
represent a quality label, a German state-sponsored body, Centrale Mar-
keting-Gesellschaft, in 1993 made a quality label exclusively for products 
produced in Germany,222 which was not well received by the ECJ which 
held that quality marking was also bound by Article 34 TFEU223 on the 
grounds that it had potentially restrictive effects on the internal mar-
ket.224 Furthermore, the ECJ held that a scheme which promotes dome-
stic goods produced in Germany might encourage consumers to buy pro-
ducts with the quality label rather than imported products without the 
label.225 It follows from this that royal warrants may have the same effect 
on consumers when they choose between domestic products with a royal 
warrant and foreign products without similar quality labelling. Examples 
219 De Burca & Others (n 1377) 62.
220 Hojnik (n 20808) 298.
221 Buy Irish (n 2100) Opinion of AG Capotorti para 7.
222 Hojnik (n 20808) 299.
223 Case C-325/00 Commission v Germany [2002] ECR I-9977, para 18.
224 Hojnik (n 20808) 306.
225 Commission v Germany (n 2233) paras 23-24, where the Court refers to Case C-13/78 
Eggers [1978] ECR 1935, para 26.
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of similar cases have previously occurred in the EU. In 1995 the Austrian 
Ministry of Agriculture introduced a quality seal showing food that had 
been produced in Austria and that was of the highest level of quality.226 
This did not sit well with the Commission which in 2012 initiated procee-
dings under Article 108(2) TFEU against Austria.227 The case is pending. 
An Italian company, Buonitalia SpA, founded by the Italian government 
in 2003, issued quality labels for products exclusively made in Italy,228 
but there have been no proceedings against Italy. This raises the que-
stion of whether private companies and different kinds of public body 
and, in this case, monarchies, should be considered an emanation of the 
state. Our assessment in section 5 indicates that monarchies do fall wit-
hin the concept of state. Just like the Italian government, back in 1961, 
the French government co-financed a company, Sopexa, which promoted 
and advertised French food, wine and l’art de vivre.229 However, like Buo-
nitalia SPA, Sopexa has never been under the spotlight of the ECJ,230 and 
the Commission’s practice is therefore unclear. Janja Hojnik emphasises 
the importance of the sponsor’s role in the campaign.231 Accordingly, it is 
necessary to distinguish between whether it is a private company or the 
state that funds the campaign to promote goods. It follows from Article 
34 TFEU that it only applies to state measures which affect the free mo-
vement of goods between Member States.232 Hence, it can be derived that 
only campaigns in which the state is involved, including campaigns by 
central and regional authorities, are covered by Article 34 TFEU.233 In the 
case of Apple and Pear Development Council234 and the ‘Buy British Fruit’ 
campaign, the ECJ held that a government-supported body, such as the 
Development Council, is under the duty not to advertise for the purpose 
of discouraging the purchase of products of other Member States, nor to 
disparage those products in the eyes of consumers or to advise consumers 
to purchase domestic products solely by reason of their national origin. No-
netheless, the ECJ stated that Article 30 EEC (now Article 34 TFEU) does 
226 Hojnik (n 2088) 299.
227 The European Commission has initiated proceedings under Article 108(2) TFEU regar-
ding AMA marketing measures (state aid SA 15836 (2012 / C) against Austria, by letter 
dated 12 June 2012.
228 Hojnik (n 2088) 299.
229 ibid 299-300.
230 Furthermore, a written question on the legality of Sopexa has been given to the Commi-
ssion: Written question and answer No 624/81 by Mr Pearce to the Commission: Sopexa 
[1981] OJ C283, 7.  Nevertheless, neither the European Commission nor the Council has 
answered the question. 
231 Hojnik (n 208) 302.
232 Hojnik (n 20808) 302 and Banard (n 2000) 35.
233 Case 45/87 Commission v Ireland (Dundalk Water Supply) [1988] ECR 4929; Case 
C-1/90 Aragonesa de Publicidad v Departamento de Sanidad [1991] ECR I-4151.
234 Case 222/82 Apple and Pear Development Council v Lewis [1983] ECR 4083, para 18.
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not prevent such a body in its publicity from drawing attention to specific 
qualities of fruit grown in the Member State in question, or from organising 
campaigns to promote the sales of certain varieties, even if those varie-
ties are typical of national production.235 Catherine Banard emphasises 
that this highlights the ECJ’s approach to what it considers the unlawful 
state-sponsored promotion of national goods and what it considers to 
be the permissible state-sponsored promotion of specific goods having 
distinctive qualities.236 The Hungarian government has also established 
a ‘helping hand’ to promote and advertise Hungarian products in dome-
stic and export markets.237 Furthermore, it has also introduced a quality 
label entirely for Hungarian products in order to make them stand out 
from other products. The Czech Republic, Slovenia, Lithuania and even 
Croatia (which at the given time was an acceding country to the EU) have 
also introduced quality labels and promotions of national products.238 
Ethnocentric market campaigning therefore seems an on-going tendency 
and a particularly well-used tool by national governments during financi-
al crises.239 Furthermore, it is important to draw attention to the fact that 
the monarchies in Denmark and the UK serve as state officials, with the 
Queen of Denmark and the Queen of England positioned as Head of State 
pursuant to the constitutions, and the royal families in general represen-
ting the state on various occasions.240 Thus, their acts, ie their awarding 
of royal warrants, may constitute public statements of officials represen-
ting the state’s point of view and may be a potential breach of EU law. In 
the case of AGM-COS.MET Srl v Suomen valtio in Tarmen Lehtinen241 the 
ECJ held that states are responsible for the public statements of their 
officials who reflect the state’s official point of view, regardless of whether 
they have a binding effect or not. Furthermore, as emphasised by Janja 
Hojnik, ethnocentric campaigns are full of public statements242 and are 
incompatible with EU law. This is not just an interesting conclusion by 
the ECJ in relation to Article 34 TFEU, but also an indirect supplement 
to the ECJ’s definition of ‘emanation of the state’ in the Fosters v British 
Gas case mentioned earlier in this paper. 
235 ibid para 19.
236 Banard (n 2000) 83.
237 Hojnik (n 208) 300.
238 ibid.
239 ibid 293.
240 See section 6.
241 Case C-470/03 AGM-COS.MET Srl v Suomen valtio in Tarmen Lehtinen [2007] ECR 
I-2749.
242 Hojnik (n 20808) 303.
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8.3 Discrimination
In Buy Irish,243 the ECJ clearly held that it prohibits campaigns 
which discriminate against products from other Member States. The list 
of companies awarded royal warrants by the Danish monarchy is com-
posed significantly of Danish companies, with only 8 foreign suppliers.244 
Looking to the neighbouring monarchy, the British list of suppliers is 
much more diverse with regards to the nationality of suppliers. For exam-
ple, suppliers such as French champagne makers and Swedish match 
producers appear on the list. However, there is still a significant majority 
of suppliers of own national origin. Monarchies may argue that the pro-
ducts from its own nation are more easily accessible, incidentally chosen 
by factors such as the royal families’ individual taste, culture, history, 
tendencies in the country, etc. Recalling subsection 4.1.4, providing do-
mestic products with the advantage of advertising245 subsidised by the 
state can affect the position of businesses from other Member States 
who seek to operate on the Danish or British market. It therefore indica-
tes that the monarchies discriminate against suppliers from other Mem-
ber States. In his book Det Koster et Kongerige, Danish journalist Jens 
Høvsgaard uncovers various examples of relations between the compani-
es awarded royal warrants and the Danish monarchy’s circle of friends.246
8.4 National culture and tradition versus EU integration and aims
Royal warrants in both Denmark and UK are considered an old pre-
stigious national tradition, going back before the establishment of the 
EU. The provisions of the TFEU have, together with the case law of the 
ECJ, led to a considerable limitation of autonomy and the removal or im-
pact of numerous national traditions.247 However, as exemplified in Buy 
Irish, the ECJ has shown that it has a degree of tolerance for and under-
standing of the importance of tradition. Nevertheless, the internal market 
has priority248 and therefore several critics have argued that it appears 
that the EU does not care about national traditions or cultures.249 No-
netheless, in the EU Treaty it has been proclaimed that one of the goals 
243 Buy Irish (n 2066).
244 See subsection 2.2.
245 The advertisement consists of the award of a royal warrant.
246 Høvsgaard (n 20) 96-125.
247 Hojnik (n 20808) 310.
248 ibid.
249 Janja Hojnik draws attention to Case 407/85 Drei Glocken and others v USL Centro-Sud 
and others [1988] ECR I-4233, where the ECJ dismissed traditional Italian pasta standards. 
Nonetheless, the AG stated that only Italians know the exact meaning of pasta terms, eg 
spaghetti, penne, linguine, bucatini, etc. Hojnik draws attention to a statement of a British 
MP in the 1980s, where the MP held that the EU had gone too far and were now threatening 
the British sausage by standardising it, which would influence the British way of life. Hoj-
nik (n 20808) 311.
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of the EU is to deepen solidarity between peoples while respecting their 
distinct history, culture and traditions. Indeed, in its case law250 the ECJ 
has shown some sensitivity to national tradition.251 Janja Hojnik points 
to the fact that, although the ECJ tries to take national traditions into 
account, it is difficult to find a balance in cases where Member States try 
to justify ethnocentric campaigns.252 The author goes on to emphasise 
that in order for Member States to justify their ethnocentric campaigns, 
they will have to illustrate that a national tradition is the dominant and 
true goal of the campaign.253 In this respect, it is hard to justify cases like 
the Buy Irish or other ‘campaigns’ that promote domestic products with 
the aim of economic protectionism. In the case of royal warrants, the aim 
of the ‘campaign’ is to promote/favour own domestic products (since the 
majority of the suppliers are of own national origin). Even though royal 
warrants are an old tradition, it is difficult to justify them in accordance 
with Article 34 TFEU.  
8.5 A new approach
In light of Buy Irish and the general prohibition of ethnocentric cam-
paigns, the Commission has, in its recent Green Paper on promotion 
measures and information provision for agricultural products,254 adopted 
a new approach to local and regional food markets. Janja Hojink argued 
that the Commission’s fresh approach could have significant consequen-
ces on the legitimacy of promoting national products255 and on the ruling 
set by Buy Irish. Furthermore, the promotion of agricultural products on 
the EU internal market is covered by specific EU law.256 In this way, the 
EU is trying to encourage consumers to buy EU agricultural products.257 
However, as the ruling in Buy Irish established, the promotion of produc-
tion based on national region is prohibited, except in cases of specific 
regions recognised by EU law.258
250 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Autmoatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberburgermei-
ster der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609; Case C-210/06 Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató 
bt [2008] ECR I-9641; and Case C-208/09 Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann 
von Wien [2010] ECR I-13693.
251 Hojnik (n 20808) 311.
252 ibid.
253 ibid 312.
254 Commission (EC) ‘Promotion measures and information provision for agricultural pro-
ducts: A reinforced value-added European strategy for promoting the tastes of Europe’ 
(Green Paper) COM(2011) 436 final, 14 July 2011.
255 Hojnik (n 20808) 292.
256 Council Regulation (EC) 3/2008 on information provision and promotion measures for 
agricultural products on the internal market and in third countries, [2008] OJ L3/1.
257 According to Hojnik, the EU is initiating the purchase of EU agricultural products by 
co-financing promotional campaigns that highlight the quality, safety and nutritional value 
of EU farm products. Furthermore, it supports campaigns that draw attention to other in-
trinsic features and advantages of EU products. Hojnik (n 20808) 320.
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8.6 Final remarks
As mentioned earlier, case law has shown that some ethnocentric 
campaigns are in accordance with the EU provision on the free move-
ment of goods (Article 34 TFEU) under the condition that the campaign 
is solely organised by a private body or by the EU itself. However, cam-
paigns sponsored by the state are in breach of Article 34 TFEU,259 as 
can be derived from the examination in section 5 of this paper where the 
Danish and British monarchies can be seen as ‘emanations of the state’, 
which indicates that royal warrants are in breach of Article 34 TFEU. 
Furthermore, as AG Capotorti argues in his Opinion in the Buy Irish case, 
if one considers royal warrants as falling within the scope of state aid 
provisions, it follows that the UK and Denmark have failed to fulfil their 
obligations under EU law. Overall, it should be mentioned that it does not 
create a problem in itself that the royal families favour certain products 
or suppliers over others. Looking from the aspect that the royal members 
are individual persons, it may be considered that every individual person 
(royal or not) has different tastes and therefore it is their right to favour 
certain products over others. However, the essence of the problem is that 
the royal families, looking at the conclusions drawn in this paper, are to a 
certain degree state officials as heads of state, heavily funded by the state 
and regulated by public law (both in terms of their role, but also with re-
gard to their legal responsibilities). Thus, their statements and acts, such 
as awarding royal warrants, are not acts undertaken by ‘average citizens’ 
(since other individuals would not have the same influence as public fi-
gures on sales) and thus royal warrants can be interpreted as being part 
of the state’s official opinion and a campaign influenced by the state. It is 
therefore damaging for the internal market when monarchies announce 
that they prefer certain products over others by providing them with a 
special label, which can be linked to the state since it is an official mark 
with arms, seals, crowns, etc. It can be derived from the above examina-
tion that royal warrants give selected companies an advantageous posi-
tion on the domestic and export markets by providing free advertising 
subsidised by the state. Royal warrants thus distort competition on the 
internal market both from the perspective of state aid and as a measure 
having effect equivalent to a barrier on the free movement of goods. 
9 Conclusion
The predicate ‘By appointment to the Royal Court’ conveys prestige 
and favour deriving from the ‘taste’ of the members of the Danish and 
British monarchies. This paper has indicated that royal warrants provide 
a benefit for the companies thus awarded. Nonetheless, the paper has 
259 ibid.
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not proven the effect of royal warrants on competition between companies 
operating in the single market due to the lack of relevant data and sta-
tistics on the topic, but it still indicates that, for some of the companies 
awarded, a royal warrant is important for their businesses. The lists of 
suppliers clearly indicate that monarchies favour products originating 
in their own country rather than in other EU Member States and thus 
discriminate against businesses there. All this suggests an ethnocentric 
campaign of national products. In general, royal warrants are not cove-
red by the derogations from the prohibition on state aid. However, an 
individual assessment of each business awarded with a royal warrant is 
necessary. 
Recalling the earlier assessment in subsection 4.3 covering derogati-
ons from the prohibition of state aid, royal warrants do not, in principle, 
fall within any of the categories listed in Article 107(2) and (3) TFEU, and 
therefore cannot be justified thereby. This indicates that royal warrants 
are most likely in breach of the EU provisions on state aid. However, 
whether the award of a royal warrant to a specific business can be justi-
fied by the exemption requires a case-by-case assessment. 
This paper has examined the nature, tasks, finances and powers of 
the British and Danish monarchies under their countries’ national law 
and it can be concluded that there is sufficient evidence to prove that 
both lie within the case law of the ECJ’s definition of  ‘emanation of the 
state’. Especially in the UK, where the national courts have compiled a 
more thorough analysis on the aspect of emanation of the state in its case 
law, it appears that the monarchy is an emanation of the state. Literature 
indicates that both monarchies are attributable or imputable to the state 
and that public authorities are directly involved in some of the tasks and 
statements that derive from the monarchies. This paper has illustrated 
that, in respect of ethnocentric campaigns, there is a link between state 
aid and measures affecting the free movement of goods. AG Capotorti 
argued in his Opinion in Buy Irish that ‘buy national’ campaigns po-
tentially distort competition by favouring certain companies over others. 
He also emphasised that the ethnocentric campaigns in Buy Irish ought 
rather to be covered by the provisions on state aid than be treated as a 
breach of Article 34 TFEU, as was held by the Commission and was also 
the approach of the ECJ. Although the institution of monarchy is seldom 
a topic of discussion, as it is almost ‘sacred’ for many and reflects old 
cultural and traditional national heritage, and despite its legal immunity 
and the judicial and political powers of the Danish and British monarchi-
es, EU provisions on state aid and the internal market are still applicable. 
The relevant question here is whether it would be in accordance with EU 
law if, for example, the British Prime Minister provided quality labels 
saying that 10 Downing Street prefers certain British goods to products 
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of other EU Member States. This would undoubtedly be a real threat to 
the internal market of the EU as it would send a clear signal to European 
consumers who may be highly influenced by the statements of their state 
official. In the case of this paper, consumers might be even more swayed 
by the statements of members of royal families.  
Although the comparison may seem false, this paper clearly indi-
cates that monarchies are an emanation of the state, ie they are on the 
same footing as any other undertaking within the concept of state, eg 
Southampton Health Authority in Marshall, private schools in NUT v St 
Mary’s Church of England School, British Gas Ltd in Foster v British Gas, 
the Goods Council of Ireland in Buy Irish and even universities as argued 
by AG Capotorti in his Opinion in Buy Irish. 
Putting the question of monarchies as an emanation of the state into 
perspective, the research agenda could be extended to the monarchies’ 
role in terms of the EU’s provisions on public procurement and their 
purchase of specific goods or services or the receiving of gifts in relation 
to the aspect of ‘a hidden advertisement’ as a potential breach of the pro-
visions of state aid. Furthermore, the Commission has recently increased 
its focus on state aid and in many areas, especially within broadcasting, 
aviation and public transport, has tightened the margin of what is defi-
ned as acceptable aid. It has also been given more efficient and effective 
tools to combat cases that seriously distort competition. However, the 
scope of this paper is limited and therefore the above questions remain 
unanswered. In conclusion, monarchies, blue blooded or not, are institu-
tions under the same obligations of EU law as any other public body and 
should therefore comply with the applicable legislation on state aid and 
the internal market.
